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Commercial banks leverage their equity capital with demandable debt that
participates in the economy’s payments system.  The distinctive nature of this debt generates
an unusual degree of liquidity risk that can, at times, threaten the payments system.  To
reduce this threat, insurance protects deposits; and to reduce the moral hazard problems of
the debt contract and deposit insurance, bank regulation constrains risk-taking and defines
standards of capital adequacy.  The inherent liquidity risk of demandable debt as well as
potential regulatory penalties for poor financial performance creates the potential for costly
episodes of financial distress that affects banks’ employment of capital.   
The existence of financial-distress costs implies that many banks are likely to take
actions, such as holding additional capital, that increase bank safety at the expense of short-
run returns.  While such a strategy may reduce average returns in the short run, it may
maximize the market value of the bank by protecting charter value and protecting against
regulatory interventions.  On the other hand, some banks whose charter values are low may
have an incentive to follow a higher risk strategy, one that increases average return at the
expense of greater risk of financial distress and regulatory intervention.  
This paper examines how banks’ employment of capital in their production plans
affects their “market value” efficiency.  We develop a market-based measure of production
efficiency and implement it on a sample of publicly traded bank holding companies.  Our
evidence indicates that banks’ efficiency and, hence, the market value of their assets are
influenced by the level and allocation of capital.   However, even controlling for the effect
of size, we find that the influence of equity capital differs markedly between banks with
higher capital-to-assets ratios and those with lower ratios.  For inefficient banks with higher
capital-to-assets ratios, marginal increases in capitalization and asset quality boost their
market-value efficiency.  For inefficient banks with lower levels of capitalization, the signs
of these effects are reversed.  Controlling for asset size, it appears that less capitalized banks
cannot afford to mimic the investment strategy of more capitalized banks, which may be
using this greater capitalization to signal their safety to financial markets.1See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) for a review of the extensive literature on banking theory.
2See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for a discussion of the debt contract’s moral hazard problem.
Introduction
A. Demandable Debt and the Roles of Equity Capital 
Equity capital performs distinctive roles in commercial banking that complicate the
problem of employing it optimally.  These distinctive roles arise from commercial banks’
leveraging equity capital with demandable debt that participates in the economy’s payments
system.  This demandable debt--banks’ demand deposits--affords them a comparative
advantage over nonbank lenders in obtaining information needed to assess credit risk and to
monitor customers’ financial performance.  Hence, commercial banks specialize in
producing information-intensive assets and off-balance-sheet products, such as loans, credit
guarantees, and swaps.
1  Their employment of capital to produce these products and to obtain
the benefits of leverage reflects this comparative advantage.  
Demandable debt also gives banks a comparative advantage over nonbank lenders
by reducing the moral hazard problem inherent in the debt contract.
2  Unlike equity, debt
payments are fixed and, thus, do not vary with the financial success of the assets financed by
the debt.  As a result, the borrower has an incentive to substitute riskier assets to seek a
greater payoff, but this higher expected payoff is unlikely to increase the value of equity more
than it decreases the value of  debt so that the market value of assets is diminished by shifting
risk to  debtholders.   On the other hand, when debtholders can demand repayment at par at
any time, particularly any time they suspect risk shifting, the incentive to engage in asset
substitution  is reduced.  Since the informational advantage in assessing credit risk that
banks obtain from their demandable debt is equivalently an informational asymmetry
between them and their depositors concerning the riskiness of banks’ assets, uninsured
depositors have an incentive to liquidate their claims whenever bank assets appear to be
unduly risky.  The demandable nature of these uninsured claims translates the appearance of
poor asset quality into a probable liquidity crisis for the bank.  In turn, this liquidity risk
disciplines bank risk-taking.  Thus, demandable debt not only offers an informational3See Smith and Stulz (1985) for a discussion of the effect of potential financial distress on the firm’s
investment strategy.   Tufano (1996) and Smith and Stulz (1985) examine various reasons why value-
maximizing firms might trade current profits for reduced risk.
4For example, Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) employed a signaling framework to illustrate
how capital structure can resolve informational asymmetries.  Greenbaum and Thakor (1995) give several
examples of different signaling mechanisms in lending.  Hughes and Mester (forthcoming) find evidence from
cost data that banks use capital to signal risk.
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advantage in lending, but it also reduces the debt contract’s inherent incentive for the
borrower to substitute riskier assets that transfer value from debtholders to shareholders.
Hence, the discipline that demandable debt exerts over bank risk-taking  influences the level
and allocation of capital and  improves the value of banks’ assets.  
The demandable nature of banks’ debt does not entirely eliminate this moral hazard
problem.  In the usual debt contract,  covenants protect the debtholders from risk-shifting.
However,  DeYoung, Hughes, and Moon (1997) note that banks’ depositors are not explicitly
covered by such covenants; instead,  bank regulation substitutes for these missing covenants.
To issue demandable debt that participates in the economy’s payments system, banks must
obtain a valuable charter and comply with numerous safety-and-soundness regulations  (or
covenants).  When banks experience episodes of financial distress, they must submit to
additional regulatory constraints (or remedial covenants) on their risk-taking and may even
have their charters revoked.  To reduce these expected costs of financial distress,  banks are
likely to take actions that increase bank safety at the expense of short-run returns.
3  While
such a strategy decreases current profitability, it maximizes banks’  market value by
protecting them from liquidity crises,  regulatory intervention, and loss of their valuable
charters.  The employment of capital is an important part of this stategy.  Its allocation to
risk-producing assets and off-balance-sheet products shapes banks’ overall risk while its
level directly protects banks from financial distress.  Moreover, the level of capital also
signals a bank’s safety to less informed creditors, since it represents the bank’s own bet on
asset quality.
4  To the extent that banks can credibly signal their asset quality, they can reduce
the probability of liquidity crises, lower the cost of their borrowed funds, and, hence, increase
their market value.
Since neither the demandable nature of bank debt nor the disciplining covenants of5See Merton (1977).
6Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger and Mester (1997) provide an extensive survey of this
literature.
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bank regulation completely eliminate the potential for liquidity crises and disruptions to the
payments system, bank deposits are protected by deposit insurance.  Deposit insurance
eliminates the need for insured depositors to fear asset substitution.  To the extent that this
component of bank discipline is replaced by insurance premiums that properly price risk-
taking, insurance should not lead to increased moral hazard.  However, when a bank’s
insurance is underpriced, it subsidizes risk-taking and works against the risk-reducing
incentives of financial distress.
5   Thus, the optimal employment of capital is influenced, as
well, by the risk subsidy of mispriced deposit insurance.
In summary, the problem of allocating capital efficiently must account for the roles
of capital as a source of loanable funds, as protection against financial distress, and as a
signal of risk.  In addition, it must allow for the incentives created by mispriced deposit
insurance.  Banks that achieve efficient allocations maximize the market value of their assets.
To investigate how commercial banks' employment  of  equity  capital affects their financial
performance,  we  develop  a  market-based measure of production efficiency and implement
it on a  sample  of publicly traded  bank  holding  companies.   We  test  how  banks'
employment of capital  in  their  production  plan  affects  their “market-value” efficiency,
and we draw conclusions about the efficient allocation of capital in commercial banking.  In
particular,  we find evidence of a signaling equilibrium where banks signal better asset
quality with their capitalization.
B. Measuring Bank Efficiency  
Numerous studies have measured bank efficiency by estimating frontier cost and
profit functions to identify “best-practice.”
6   However, the ultimate arbiter of bank efficiency
is the market value of the bank.  If financial markets are informationally efficient, a bank’s
efficiency should be reflected in its market value.  The standard profit and cost functions may
not fully account for market value.  Modigliani and Miller (1958) note that, when uncertainty4
exists, the objective of profit maximization fails to account for the riskiness of the production
plan and, hence, the rate of interest at which the stream of profits is discounted.  Thus,
maximizing the market value of the firm to its owners is a more appropriate goal of the
firm’s managers.  Another advantage of using market values to measure efficiency is that
these values reflect not only the current prices and quantities of inputs and outputs, but also
all relevant expected future cash flows and expected costs of financial distress.  If a firm
undertakes expenditures that have low or even negative returns in the short run, but increase
profits in the future, efficient financial markets will accurately reflect the discounted value
of those expenditures. Thus, if a bank’s management is efficiently taking actions that lower
profitabilitiy while protecting charter value and guarding against liquidity crises and
regulatory interventions, we would expect these decisions to increase the market value of the
bank.  
Since a bank’s market value reflects all these various considerations, we propose to
measure the bank’s efficiency by comparing its market value to those of its peers. To
compute market-value inefficiency, we identify “best-practice” banks of a given size by
estimating a stochastic frontier for the market value relative to the book value--both of assets
and of  equity.  We measure inefficiency by the distance of the bank’s observed market value
from the “best-practice” market value on the frontier.  This distance is the bank’s lost market
value due to its production inefficiency and its poorer market opportunities.  We designate
this distance as the bank’s market-value inefficiency, and we ask how it responds to the
bank’s employment of capital in its production plan.  
We have suggested that some banks might improve market value by increasing safety
at the expense of lower short-term profits.  These banks would reduce their market-value
inefficiency by lowering leverage and generally lowering risk.  On the other hand, some
banks may be able to profitably exploit the deposit insurance subsidy and will increase
market value by increasing leverage and taking greater risk.  We find evidence in our data
of both types of banks.  These two types are distinguished by their degree of capitalization.
Controlling for size, we find that banks with high capital-to-assets ratios increase market
value when they increase capital or raise the quality of their assets.  In contrast, banks with7Lower level holding companies--holding companies owned by the highest level companies--are not
individually included in the sample since their business strategies are likely to depend on the strategy of their
highest level owner.  Hence, only the highest level companies are considered.
8The discussion in this section relies on Hughes and Moon (1995).
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low capital-to-assets ratios enhance their market value when they increase leverage and
assume greater credit risk.  This dichotomy in capital’s effect on market value appears
consistent with the signaling role of capital.  More capitalized banks seem able to signal their
relatively low  risk credibly and, consequently, to increase their market value.  To the extent
that these banks are inefficient because of their employment of capital, they can reduce this
inefficiency by  increasing their capitalization.  To the extent that less capitalized banks are
inefficient because of their employment of capital, they diminish this inefficiency by
decreasing their capitalization.
In the sections that follow, we consider banks’ unique asset production problem that
results from leveraging their portfolios with demand deposits. We show how banks that are
efficient producers of assets maximize their market value.  We suggest that capital plays a
dichotomous  role in promoting market-value efficiency, a role that depends  on the amount
of risk banks assume in their production plans.  Finally, we develop our market-value
measures of efficiency and apply them to a sample of the highest level bank holding
companies
7 in the United States in 1994 to investigate how banks’ employment of capital
influences their financial performance.
1. Efficient Production and the Employment of Capital
8
  Individual investors all face the same efficient risk-return frontier of market assets.
Their choice set is determined exogenously by the risk and return characteristics of individual
securities they purchase.  Banks, however, face a  more complex  investment  problem than
that of individual investors.  On the one hand, commercial  banks in the United States cannot
legally invest in many of  the  assets found in the individual investor's portfolio, but,  on  the
other hand, only commercial banks can  leverage their portfolios with  demand  deposits.9Flannery (1989) made a similar point in a different context.
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These deposits give commercial banks a  comparative  advantage  in producing and investing
in  information-intensive  loans.   Hence, banks  not  only  purchase  assets, but  they also
use  this   comparative advantage to produce assets.  When banks are efficient  investors,
they are also efficient producers.     
Banks combine labor and physical capital as  well  as  equity capital  and  borrowed
funds  to  produce   information-intensive assets and off-balance-sheet products.   The
production  process  for  these   assets and products   involves collecting  information,
assessing  credit  risk,  writing contracts,  monitoring  borrowers’  financial   performance,
and managing borrowers’  financial  distress.  Banks  that  are  more efficient at
accomplishing these tasks expect a higher return  and a lower variance of return on individual
loans. Hence, banks that are more efficient producers reduce both the systematic and
idiosyncratic components of an individual loan’s total variance through better credit
assessment, contract writing, and monitoring.
9  Unlike individual investors, banks can
influence the magnitude of an individual asset’s systematic risk or “beta.”  When loans are
combined in banks’ portfolios, more efficient banks can expect a lower variance for any
given return on their portfolios.  Thus, capital markets price this efficiency.
Like individual investors, banks are concerned with the diversification of their
portfolios and with their asset compositions.   However, since banks are producing assets,
their portfolios have a geographic reference that is associated with the location of their
production processes.  Banks in the United States have historically faced a number of legal
restrictions on branching that have limited their size and ability to diversify geographically.
These restrictions have led banks to seek other avenues of diversfication by using such means
as loan participations, correspondent-respondent relationships, and interstate holding
companies.  These restrictions on branching have considerably complicated banks’
investment decisions.
Because banks produce as well as purchase assets,  their portfolio production
processes generate idiosyncratic risk that is not eliminated by simply combining assets in
banks' portfolios.  Although banks' owners can diversify this risk  in  their  own  portfolios,10Levy and Sarnat (1970) made a similar point about idiosyncratic risk in relation to conglomerate
mergers.  They argued that two unrelated firms that merge can reduce the expected costs of bankruptcy because
there may be some states of nature where the cash flow from one subsidiary can be used to prevent the other
subsidiary from entering  bankruptcy.  The authors note that this reduction in expected bankruptcy costs cannot
be replicated by an external investor.  This result has a direct parallel to a bank that merges with another bank
since the expected costs of financial distress can be reduced in a way that an investor, such as a depositor,
cannot duplicate.  Therefore, the reduction of idiosyncratic risk via bank-initiated rather than investor-initiated
diversification may affect the market value of the bank.
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they cannot eliminate its effect on the expected cost of financial distress.  Since idiosyncratic
risk as  well  as systematic  risk influences the probability of financial  distress,  it  is  likely
that idiosyncratic risk will affect market  value.  Given two banks with the same total return,
the bank that is more efficient at controlling idiosyncratic risk as well as systematic risk is
likely to have a higher total market value, ceteris paribus.
10 
A bank’s market value, of course, ultimately depends on the market’s perception of
its risk.  The actual quality of a bank’s assets and the resources and skill a bank brings to the
task of maintaining asset quality are relatively opaque to outsiders.   If banks with high
quality  assets can credibly signal their low risk to outsiders, they can improve their market
value in two ways.  First, by lowering the cost of borrowed funds, they improve their cash
flows, and, second, by reducing the information asymmetry between bank insiders and
outsiders, low-risk banks can decrease the “lemons” mark-up on the discount rate applied to
their cash flows.  
2. The Signaling Role of Equity Capital
Since capital is a cushion against losses and, hence, protection against financial
distress, its level influences the probability of financial distress and is a critical consideration
in dealing with liquidity risk.  Moreover, since capital represents the bank’s own bet on the
quality of its assets and on its efforts at maintaining asset quality, the level of capital can
function as a credible signal of the bank’s exposure to risk.
Given their asset sizes, lower-risk banks may choose to hold higher levels of capital
as a signal to outsiders that their exposure to risk is lower.  A higher-risk bank cannot afford
to mimic a lower-risk bank’s signal because the opportunity cost of holding this extra capital11The “lemons” penalty for borrowing not only encourages safer-than-average banks to use greater
equity financing, it also gives them the incentive to hold larger amounts of marketable government securities
to avoid having to meet liquidity needs either by uncollaterized borrowing or by selling information-intensive
assets, a point made by  Lucas and McDonald (1992) to motivate a model in which holdings of government
securities serve as a signal of risk.
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is greater for them.  These banks, by definition, hold riskier assets than lower-risk banks, and,
in an informationally efficient loan market, they expect a higher return on their assets than
do lower-risk banks to compensate them for their assets’ greater expected losses and
variance. This difference in opportunity costs creates the potential for a separating
equilibrium.  If there were a pooling equilibrium, the average cost of borrowed funds would
result in a “lemons” penalty on borrowing for lower-risk banks that would encourage them
to take a greater equity stake in their assets’ better-than-average performance, while, for
higher-risk banks, the average cost of borrowed funds would represent a subsidy on
borrowing, like the subsidy created by mispriced deposit insurance,  that could be exploited
by taking additional risks through increased leverage and  reduced asset quality.  Hence,
these differences in incentives between higher and lower-risk banks can lead to a separating
equilibrium in which higher-quality banks are able to signal their lower risk  to outsiders by
their degree of capitalization--the stake they take in the performance of the assets they
produce.  This signal is credible because the higher-risk banks cannot afford to mimic it.
11
The potential for signaling suggests that we might observe a distribution of capital structures
in which the highest-quality banks, controlling for asset size, have the highest capitalization
while the lowest-quality banks are least capitalized.  Hence, the role of capital in promoting
market-value efficiency is likely to differ across this distribution of structures.
3. Efficiency Measurement Using Market Values
To measure efficiency, we focus  on  the  difference  between banks' market and book
values of assets.   In the absence of agency problems, maximizing the value of a firm’s equity
is equivalent to maximizing the value of its assets.  However, the potential for agency
problems, such as asset substitution, raises the possibility that maximizing the market value12Since goodwill is a component of market value, it should be subtracted from book value to obtain
a proxy for replacement cost.   See Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) for a discussion of using adjusted
book value as a proxy for replacement costs. 
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of equity leads to a suboptimal value of assets.  To allow for this latter case, we measure
inefficiency from the market value of assets, but we also compute inefficiency from the
market value of equity for comparison.
The book value of assets net of goodwill can be interpreted as a proxy for the assets’
replacement cost.
12 The difference between a bank’s market and book values depends both
on its  production  decisions  and  on its  external  economic  environment.    The   former
reflects efficiency while the latter varies with  such  factors  as  market power and
macroeconomic conditions in the markets in which it operates.  Controlling for a bank’s size,
measured by its book value of assets net of goodwill, we compute the “best-practice” market
value that we observe in our sample at this adjusted book value and gauge the bank’s
inefficiency by the difference between the “best-practice” value and its observed market
value. This difference represents the bank's failure to attain the highest market value for its
book value.  Not all of this difference is  due to inefficiency, but we do not need to make this
distinction.  For our purposes, it is sufficient to ask how this difference is affected by the
production plan and, in particular, by the employment of equity capital since the answer to
this question will identify how these factors contribute to efficiency.
To determine the “best-practice” market value for any particular adjusted book value,
we use  stochastic  frontier  estimation  techniques to regress market value on a quadratic
function of book  value.  The estimated stochastic frontier identifies an upper  envelope  of
market value to book value. We then regress this difference on variables that  characterize
the bank's external market conditions and  its  leveraged  portfolio production plan to identify
how market value  and  efficiency  are affected by them.  In particular,  we  focus on how the
bank's employment of capital and its allocation to bank assets and activities influence
efficiency.
A. The Empirical Model for Measuring Inefficiency  13The standard profit function used to measure efficiency accounts for the part of the expected cash
flow to shareholders that is due to production  in the current period, E(CFEi,0 ).  Since it assumes that current
period profit is maximized, it does not allow for the influence of expected costs of financial distress on the
current production plan or its expected profitability.
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To illustrate the relationship between book and market values, we use a simple
discounted cash-flow model.  In a multiple period setting, the current market value of the i-th
firm’s assets, MVAi,0 , is
(1)










where E(CFEi,t  ) is the i-th firm’s expected cash flow paid to its shareholders at time t while
E(CFDi,t  ) is the expected cash flow paid to debtholders at time t.  The shareholders’ required
return on equity for the i-th firm is ki while ri is the debtholders’ required return.   The
expected cash flows are the sum of  the expected cash flows in solvent states of the world
and in financially distressed states.  Hence, this sum accounts for the expected costs of
financial distress.
13  
The cash flows depend on the i-th bank’s current and future production plans.  The
production plan consists of the bank’s on- and off-balance-sheet products, designated by the
vector, yi,t ; the  level of equity capital, k i,t ; the amounts of other financial and nonfinancial
inputs, xi,t ; and by variables, ni,t , characterizing the credit quality of the outputs,  yi,t  .  These
variables are measured by their book values.  We observe only the current production plan
( yi,0 , ki,0 , xi,0 , ni,0 ).  Hence, our investigation focuses on how the current plan influences the
market value of assets, MVAi,0 , and of equity, MVEi,0 .  Nevertheless, we might expect that
the current production plan is a good proxy for future production plans and cash flows.  The
efficiency of a bank’s current production plan is likely to indicate the bank’s ability to
generate future cash flows and to manage the risk that affects the discount rate on these cash                                                                                           11
flows.  In addition, some components of the current production plan may proxy expected
costs of financial distress.  For example, the expected cash flow and risk associated with the
current production plan along with the degree of capitalization figure into the bank’s risk of
insolvency as well as its charter value.  If we interpret the amount of nonperforming loans
as one of the measures of asset quality, ni,0 , then it, too, may give some indication of the
probability and magnitude of financial distress.
In addition to influencing expected cash flows, the current production plan affects the
bank’s required return on capital, ki .  If we assume that a single-factor, asset-pricing model
adequately describes the bank’s securities, the required return is a function of the bank’s
market “beta” and, to the extent that its expected costs of financial distress are significant,
it is also a function of the bank’s idiosyncratic risk.  Since the bank produces these securities
using the comparative advantage it obtains from demand deposits, it can alter the trade-off
between the expected return and riskiness of its bank-specific assets through  the resources
and skill it brings to bear on the tasks of credit evaluation,  contract writing, monitoring, and
managing clients’ financial distress.  A change in these factors can alter the bank’s exposure
both to systematic risk, measured by “beta,” and to idiosyncratic risk, measured by the
market model’s standard error.  These factors are, of course, components of the bank’s
current production plan.  Consequently, they are endogenous to the production process.  
Since the current production plan influences both expected cash flows and the
discount rates applied to the cash flows, we can summarize these notions in a stylized
valuation model:
   =   g( yi,0 , ki,0 , xi,0 , ni,0 ), (2) MVAi,0 ' MVEi,0 % MVLi,0
which can, in turn, be used to estimate inefficiency.     
If we denote the book value of the i-th bank’s total assets by BVAi,0 , we can define
the market-value inefficiency of its assets, IEi , by the difference between the “best-practice”
market value, FMVA0 |BVA i,0 ,  and the bank’s observed market value, MVAi,0  :14Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt (1982) first proposed this technique.  It has been extensively
employed in a variety of contexts.  For its application to banking,  see Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger
and Mester (1997).
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                    IEi = FMVA0 | BVA i,0  - MVAi,0 . (3)
The frontier market value can be interpreted as the market value of the most valuable bank
of comparable size.  To obtain  this upper envelope of observed market values defined over
adjusted book values, we employ stochastic frontier analysis.
14
This upper envelope of market values is estimated by appending a composed error
term to a regression of observed market values on adjusted book values.  The composed error
term,   i , consists of a two-sided term,   i ,  that captures statistical noise and a one-sided
term,   µi ,  that gauges inefficiency.  This composed term fits an upper boundary to the data
rather than  an average relationship.  We employ a quadratic specification of the regression
equation to  allow for the possibility that the relationship between market and book value is
nonlinear.  The resulting equation is
MVAi,0   =    +    (BVAi,0 ) +    (BVAi,0 )
 2
  +   i   (4)
where
i =  i - µi ,  i  ~  iid N( 0,
2 ),  µi ($0 ) ~ iid N( 0, µ
2 ), which is estimated using maximum
likelihood.  The frontier value is given by 
  FMVA0   =    +    (BVAi ,0) +    (BVAi,o ) 
2 (5)
while inefficiency is measured by
IEi = E( µi |  i ) = FMVA0  - (MVAi,0 -  i ) ,        (6)                                                                                           13
where (MVAi,0 -  i  ) is the noise-adjusted, observed market value of assets.  These estimates
are measured in dollars of lost market value.
Substituting (2) into (6), we obtain 
IEi = h( yi,0 , ki,0 , xi,0 , ni,0 ), (7)
which indicates that a bank’s level of inefficiency measured by market value is a function of
the bank’s production plan and, in particular, its employment of capital.  We estimate this
relationship using ordinary least squares.  Measuring efficiency in terms of the market value
of assets is appropriate when agency problems allow shareholders to transfer value from
debtholders.  In the absence of agency problems, efficiency can be measured equivalently
in terms of the market value of equity.  To compare the evidence that would be obtained
from the latter measure, we compute both.  Since we find no significant qualitative
differences between the conclusions we draw from the two approaches, we report only the
findings from the asset-based measure.
B.  The Data
We estimate (4) and (7) using data on 190 highest level bank holding companies in
the  United States in 1994.  The balance-sheet items were obtained primarily from the
Federal Reserve Y-9C Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies.
The end-of-year book values of equity and total liabilities as well as the number of shares
outstanding were obtained from the Standard & Poor’s Compustat data base while end-of-
year stock prices were retrieved from the data banks of the Center for Research in Securities
Prices (CRSP).
The production plan, ( yi,0 , ki,0 , xi,0 , ni,0 ), is specified as follows.  The outputs, ( yi,0),
include on- and off-balance-sheet products.  The former consist of liquid assets (the sum of
cash, balances due, federal funds sold, reverse repurchase agreements, and securities),
commercial and industrial loans, agricultural loans,  loans to individuals, real estate loans,
other loans, leases, assets held in trading accounts,  investments in unconsolidated                                                                                           14
subsidiaries, intangible assets, customers’ liabilities related to bank acceptances, and other
assets.  The off-balance-sheet products are credit guarantees (unused portions of lines of
credit, standby letters of credit, and so on), the notional amount of swaps, and the notional
amount of all futures and options activity.  Equity capital,  ki,0 ,  is measured by the book-
value of shareholders’ equity.  The inputs,  xi,0 , consist of labor (measured by the number of
full-time equivalent employees), physical capital (measured by the amount of premises and
fixed assets), uninsured domestic deposits, all other domestic deposits, and other borrowing
(foreign deposits, federal funds purchased, repurchase agreements,  commercial paper,
subordinated notes and debentures, mandatory convertible securities, trading account
liabilities, mortgage indebtedness, and all other borrowing).  The credit quality of output,
ni,0 , is proxied by nonperforming loans (the sum of accruing and nonaccruing loans, leases,
and other assets past due 90 days or more) plus gross charge-offs.  We add charge-offs to
past-due loans to account for differences among banks in their aggressiveness toward
charging off past-due loans.   To control for exogenous market conditions, a 10-year,
weighted average growth rate of personal income is included: for each state in which the
bank operates, the state’s 10-year average growth rate in personal income is weighted by  the
bank’s proportion of assets located in that state.  Table 1 reports summary statistics for these
data.
4. Explaining Differences in Efficiency
The results of regressing inefficiency, equation (7), on the variables that characterize
the production plan are shown in Table 2.  The first column of coefficients is derived by
estimating (7) using the entire sample of 190 bank holding companies.  Since the results may
differ between larger and smaller banks, we divide the sample in half.  The second and third
columns of coefficients report the results for the two halves, whose dividing line occurs at
$2 billion.  The signs of the coefficients in these three columns are generally in agreement.
Another distinction between banks that could imply that the full-sample results are
misleading is the level of capitalization.    The possibility that lower-risk banks signal their
riskiness with the level of capital they put at risk suggests that the role of capital will differ                                                                                           15
between banks with higher and lower capital-to-assets ratios.  Consequently, we divide the
sample into more and less capitalized banks so that the latter group contains one-third of the
sample while the former consists of two-thirds.  The capital-to-assets ratio that brings about
this division is 0.0773.  The fourth and fifth columns of coefficients in Table 2 report the
findings that follow from this breakdown. 
Controlling for asset size, we find distinct differences between banks that have higher
capital-to-assets ratios and those with lower ratios.  The signs of the coefficients on types of
assets are generally negative and significant for the less capitalized group while they are
positive and significant for the more capitalized banks.  Hence, if we control for the
unadjusted book value of capital, an increase in the level of most types of assets or,
equivalently, a decrease in the capital-to-assets ratio decreases inefficiency for less
capitalized banks while it increases inefficiency for more capitalized banks.
When we turn to the effect on inefficiency of the level of capital, measured by its
unadjusted book value, once again, after controlling for asset size, we find that the effect
differs between the two groups.  For the less capitalized group, an increase in capital
increases inefficiency while, for the more capitalized group, it decreases inefficiency.  Since
an increase in capital, given asset size, is equivalent to an increase in the capital-to-assets
ratio, this difference in coefficients on capital implies that an increase in the capital-to-assets
ratio for the less capitalized group increases inefficiency while it decreases inefficiency for
the more capitalized banks.  Hence, the implications of the differences in sign between the
coefficients on assets and those on equity capital are in agreement.
This evidence suggests that inefficient holding companies with lower capitalization
improve their performance by reducing capital-to-assets ratios while those with higher
capitalization achieve better financial performance by increasing their capital ratios.  Hence,
the less capitalized group appears to improve efficiency by taking on more risk, and the more
capitalized group, less risk.  This interpretation receives some support from the statistically
significant negative sign on nonperforming loans (plus charge-offs) for the less capitalized
banks.  When these banks assume more credit risk, they can expect a higher level of
nonperformance.  Hence, the negative sign suggests that the less capitalized group can also15This difference in the effect of capital on market value efficiency could also be due to differences
in charter value.  If banks in the more capitalized group have a higher ratio of market value to book value, they
may hold more capital to protect their higher charter value, and among those banks that are inefficient, they
may improve their efficiency by adding more protection.  However, examining the market-to-book ratios for
assets and equity in Table 1 shows that there is no statistically significant difference between banks in the more
and less capitalized groups.
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improve efficiency by assuming more credit risk.
These dichotomous findings extend as well to the signs on the coefficients for the
three types of borrowed funds.  The statistically significant positive signs for the holding
companies in the less capitalized group imply that increased borrowing increases their
inefficiency while, for the greater capitalized group, the negative signs indicate that increased
borrowing reduces their inefficiency.  This difference in signs suggests that investors
distinguish between more and less capitalized banks.
If, in fact, investors discriminate among banks by their degree of capitalization, and
if less capitalized, inefficient banks can enhance their efficiency by decreasing their capital
ratios,  it would appear that the more capitalized banks can provide a credible signal of  their
riskiness by the level of capital they put at risk.
15  Our evidence seems to suggest that the less
efficient banks in this group can improve their performance by increasing their capital-to-
assets ratios.  In contrast, it would appear that banks in the group with lower capital-to-assets
ratios cannot provide a credible signal by their level of capital.  In fact, the less efficient
banks in this group can improve their performance by reducing their capital-to-assets ratios.
In line with our signaling argument, this evidence may imply that investors penalize less
capitalized banks (by reducing their market valuation) whose capital levels appear to send
a false signal that their assets are of better quality.  That is, less capitalized banks cannot
afford to mimic the signal of better capitalized banks because their opportunity costs are too
high. 
5. Conclusions 
Our evidence indicates that the level and allocation of equity capital influences banks’
efficiency and, hence, the market value of their assets.  However, even controlling for the17
effect of asset size, we find that the influence of equity capital differs markedly between
banks with higher capital-to-assets ratios and those with lower ratios.  This dichotomy in
effect suggests that banks with higher capital-to-assets ratios are able to provide a credible
signal of their riskiness by the level of capital they put at risk. 18
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Bank Holding Companies
                      +Measured in thousands of dollars.
                  *Inefficiency ratios are the amount of lost value divided by the observed market value.
I.  Full Sample (n = 190)    Mean     Std. Dev.   Minimum      Maximum
Asset Inefficiency Ratio* 
Equity Inefficiency Ratio*
0.0289168 0.0341621 0.00013625 0.2231045
0.4459849 0.8749832 0.0028606 7.6140949
Market-to-Book Assets 1.0363696 0.0321529 0.9702756 1.1718826
Market-to-Book Equity 1.4368271 0.3743982 0.5631479 2.6226742
Market Value of Assets+ 12822466 31512790.75 155108.25 249287434
Adjusted B.V. Assets+ 12549629.8 31328410.3 159860 250447500
Book Value of Assets+ 12613070.6 31505390.21 159860 250489000
B.V. Capital/B.V. Assets 0.0849826 0.0159363 0.0442443 0.1353974
II. Smaller Half of Sample (Total Assets < $2 Billion, n = 96 )
Asset Inefficiency Ratio* 0.0521778 0.0346014 0.016013 0.2231045
Equity Inefficiency Ratio* 0.815847 1.1134749 0.1155143 7.6140949
Market-to-Book Assets 1.0385358 0.0374851 0.9702756 1.1718826
Market-to-Book Equity 1.4300979 0.417894 0.5631479 2.5431147
Market Value of Assets+ 934999.85 527957.47 155108.25 2139888.75
Adjusted B.V. Assets+ 897583.17 503686.99 159860 1975677
Book Value of Assets+ 900645.83 505049.42 159860 1984629
B.V. Capital/B.V. Assets 0.0900651 0.0166454 0.0442443 0.1353974
III. Larger Half of Sample (Total Assets > $ 2 Billion, (n = 94)
Asset Inefficiency Ratio* 0.0051609 0.0044498 0.00013625 0.0164349
Equity Inefficiency Ratio* 0.0682533 0.0630257 0.0028606 0.3000964
Market-to-Book Assets 1.0341573 0.0256092 0.9825025 1.1286057
Market-to-Book Equity 1.4436995 0.326166 0.7522922 2.6226742
Market Value of Assets+ 24962857 41509240.79 2103458 249287434
Adjusted B.V. Assets+ 24449592.4 41364937.64 2030235 250447500
Book Value of Assets+ 24574695.9 41601834.34 2030235 250489000
B.V. Capital/B.V. Assets 0.0797919 0.0133865 0.0484868 0.1333966
IV. Less Capitalized 1/3 of Sample (Capital-to-Assets Ratio < 7.73%, n=64)
Asset Inefficiency Ratio* 0.024398 0.0399184 0.00013625 0.2231045
Equity Inefficiency Ratio* 0.5887181 1.3798845 0.0028606 7.6140949
Market-to-Book Assets 1.0240151 0.0298291 0.9702756 1.1111299
Market-to-Book Equity 1.3597754 0.4377585 0.5631479 2.4884998
Market Value of Assets+ 24368550 43227901.15 155108.25 249287434
Adjusted B.V. Assets+ 23977140.9 43055584.16 159860 250447500
Book Value of Assets+ 24058305.9 43130004.12 159860 250489000
B.V. Capital/ B.V. Assets 0.0694074 0.0068875 0.0442443 0.0772241
V. More Capitalized 2/3 of Sample (Capital-to-Assets Ratio > 7.73%, n = 126)
Asset Inefficiency Ratio* 0.031212 0.0307522 0.00016452 0.1450918
Equity Inefficiency Ratio* 0.3734854 0.4268425 0.0033018 2.1866924
Market-to-Book Assets 1.0426449 0.0315727 0.9751226 1.1718826
Market-to-Book Equity 1.4759645 0.3328312 0.690944 2.6226742
Market Value of Assets+ 6957788.45 21372293.92 238472 211675396
Adjusted B.V. Assets+ 6745179.75 21186140.24 238216 211764250
Book Value of Assets+ 6799617.73 21496996.2 238216 21547500021
B.V. Capital/B.V. Assets 0.0928938 0.0131452 0.0778753 0.1353974
Table 2.  OLS Regressions of Bank Inefficiency
*Significant at the 10% level, **at the 5% level, ***at the 1% level.T-statistics are reported in
parentheses.  White standard errors are computed from a multiplicative heteroskedastic model.  
Dependent Variable Book Value Book Value Less Better
Assets Assets Capitalized Capitalized
Full < $2 Bil. > $2 Bil. < 7.73% > 7.73%
N 190 96 94 64 126
Constant 34729*** 34601*** 34991*** 34655*** 34639***
(481.87) (1753.92) (166.28) (250.71) (838.82)
Cash and Securities -0.00060*** -0.00047 -0.00073** -0.00202*** 0.00131***
(-2.94) (-1.17) (-2.16) (-7.67) (4.24)
C&I Loans -0.00023 -0.00072 -0.00034 -0.00020*** 0.00103***
(-1.13) (-1.55) (-1.03) (-6.32) (3.53)
Agricultural Loans -0.00180*** -0.00071 -0.00196*** -0.00150* 0.00265***
(-4.92) (-1.15) (-2.96) (-1.73) (7.11)
Individual Loans -0.00050** -0.00068 -0.00053 -0.00184*** 0.00105***
(-2.51) (-1.50) (-1.61) (-6.20) (3.95)
Real Estate Loans -0.00059*** -0.00090 -0.00070** -0.00194*** 0.00122***
(-2.95) (-1.85) (-2.13) (-8.31) (3.97)
Other Loans -0.00106*** 0.00045 -0.00110*** -0.00224*** 0.00082***
(-4.70) (0.60) (-2.78) (-7.01) (2.59)
Leases -0.00146*** -0.00255*** -0.00153*** -0.00424*** 0.00028
(-5.17) (-3.29) (-2.97) (-6.42) (0.87)
Trading Account -0.00084*** -0.00148** -0.00095*** -0.00331*** 0.00109**
(-3.67) (-2.52) (-2.60) (-7.31) (2.49)
Unconsolidated
Subsidiaries
0.00777** -0.02491** 0.00494 0.03744*** 0.01759***
(2.22) (-2.51) (0.97) (6.04) (5.77)
Intangible Assets -0.00122* -0.00166 -0.00041 0.00082 0.00299***
(-1.89) (-1.37) (-0.45) (0.51) (9.29)22
Table 2.  The Determinants of Bank Inefficiency  (cont.)
Dependent Variable       
                        Full
 Assets  Assets Less Capital More Capital
< $2 Bil. > $2 Bil. < 7.73% > 7.73%
Other Assets 0.00050 -0.00099 0.00048 -0.00272*** 0.00175***
(1.37) (-0.66) (1.18) (-3.48) (6.60)
Acceptances -0.00176** -0.01673 -0.00200 0.00574* 0.00304***
(-2.20) (-0.79) (-1.44) (1.68) (5.14)
Book Value Equity -0.00107*** -0.00069 -0.00147*** 0.00175*** -0.00192***
(-4.14) (-1.21) (-3.54) (3.04) (-4.20)
Nonperforming
Assets
-0.00113** 0.00217*** -0.00073 -0.00666*** 0.00068
(-1.97) (2.79) (-0.70) (-4.82) (1.15)
Economic Growth -222.95 -94.5627 -204.831 -791.495 -534.51
(-0.32) (-0.51) (-0.11) (-0.56) (-1.43)
Credit Guarantees 0.00004*** 0.00028*** 0.00005** -0.00010*** 0.00004*
(2.93) (2.93) (2.34) (-3.05) (1.84)
Swaps 0.00007*** 0.00035 0.00007*** 0.00005*** 0.00009***
(6.32) (1.16) (5.59) (3.49) (4.68)
Futures and
Options
-0.000009** 0.00153** -0.00001** 0.00004*** -0.00003***
(-2.32) (2.25) (-2.09) (2.91) (-3.03)
Labor 0.05827* 0.20039** 0.02521 0.00046 0.01623
(1.84) (2.63) (0.48) (0.01) (0.54)
Physical Capital 0.00129* -0.00416*** 0.00016 -0.00618*** 0.00336***
(1.67) (-2.99) (1.10) (-2.76) (6.94)
Uninsured
DomesticDeposits
0.00116*** 0.00072 0.00108*** 0.00225*** -0.00132***
(5.26) (1.55) (2.81) (7.68) (-4.45)
Other Domestic
Deposits 
0.00054** 0.00071 0.00067* 0.00221*** -0.00124***
(2.53) (1.44) (1.90) (7.05) (-4.23)
Other Borrowed
Funds
0.00061*** 0.00093* 0.00077** 0.00220*** -0.00140***
(2.86) (1.89) (2.15) (7.39) (-4.82)
Adjusted R
2 .836 .506 .826 .962 .874
F-statistic 42.74 5.24 20.23 69.97 38.85